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NOTES 
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-ACCOUNTANTS AND 
ACCOUNTING-A Critical Analysis of 
Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes 
There is no common-law testimonial privilege which an accoun-
tant or his client may invoke to prevent disclosure of information 
which the client has revealed to the accountant.1 However, sixteen 
states and the commonwealth of Puerto Rico have enacted accoun-
tant-client privilege statutes.2 These states have thus decided that, 
1. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 864 
(1953); Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d 459, 463-64 (6th Cir. 1951); Himmelfarb v. 
United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); United 
States v. Stoehr, 100 F. Supp. 143, 162 n.49 (M.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd, 196 F.2d 276 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 826 (1952); In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). During 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the common-law courts recognized most 
of the privileges now existing at common law, the activities of the accounting profession 
were very limited. By the time the profession had grown in size and importance, the 
lenient attitude of the courts toward the creation of new privileges had largely dis-
appeared. Preston; Federal Recognition of State Statutes Rendering Privileged Com• 
munications Between Accountant and Client, ILL. CPA, Spring 1956, at 16. 
2. Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-749 (Supp. 1967):-
Certified public accountants and public accountants practicing in this state 
shall not be required to divulge, nor shall they voluntarily divulge, information 
which they have received by reason of the confidential nature of their employ-
ment • • . but this section shall not be construed as modifying, changing, or 
affecting the criminal or bankruptcy laws of this state or the United States. 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7(7) (1963): 
There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage 
confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person shall not be examined 
as a witness in the following cases •.. (7) A certified public accountant shall not 
be examined without the consent of his client as to any communication made 
by the client, to him in person or through the media of books of account and 
financial records, or his advice, reports or working papers given or made thereon 
in the course of professional employment .... 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.15 (1965): 
All communications between certified public accountants and public ac-
countants and the person for whom such certified public accountant or public 
accountant shall have made any audit or other investigation in a professional 
capacity, and all information obtained by certified public accountants and public 
accountants in their professional capacity concerning the business and affairs of 
clients shall be deemed privilege communications in all of the courts of this state, 
and no such certified public accountant or public accountant shall be permitted 
to testify with respect to any of said matters, except with the consent in writing 
of such client or his legal representative. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 84-216 (1965): 
Any communications to any practicing certified public accountant transmitted 
to such accountant in anticipation of, or pending, the employment of such ac-
countant shall be treated as confidential and not disclosed nor divulged by said 
accountant in any proceedings of any nature whatsoever. This rule shall not 
exclude the accountant as witness to any facts which may transpire in connection 
with his employment. 
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110½, § 51 (1965): 
A public accountant shall not be required by any court to divulge information 
or evidence which has been obtained by him in his confidential capacity as a 
public accountant. 
IOWA CODE § 116.15 (1966): 
The information acquired by registered practitioners • . . in the course of 
professional engagements shall be deemed confidential and privileged, and except 
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at least in some circumstances, evidence which might have a material 
influence on the outcome of a case should not be available at trial.3 
Because any communications privilege precludes judicial access to 
by written permission of the clients involved . . . shall not be disclosed to any 
person; provided, however, that nothing contained in this section shall be con• 
strued to modify, change, or otherwise affect the criminal or bankruptcy laws of 
this state or of the United States. 
KY. REv. STAT. § 325.440 (1962): 
A certified public accountant or public accountant shall not be required by 
any court to divulge information or evidence which has been obtained by him in 
his confidential capacity as such. 
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:85 (1964): 
No certified public accountant, public accountant, or person employed by 
certified public accountant or public accountant, shall be required to, or volun-
tarily disclose or divulge, the contents of any communication made to him by 
any person employing him to examine, audit, or report on any books, records, or 
accounts • . • except by express permission of the person employing him or his 
heirs, personal representative or successors. 
Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 75A, § 20 (1957): 
Except by express permission of the person employing him .•. a certified public 
accountant or public accountant or any person employed by him shall not be 
required to • • • disclose or divulge the contents of any communication made to 
him by any person employing him to examine, audit or report on any books, 
records, accounts or statements nor any information derived therefrom in rendering 
professional service; provided that nothing in this section shall be taken or con-
strued as modifying, changing, or affecting the criminal laws of this State or the 
bankruptcy laws. 
Act 306, § 23, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.: 
Except by written permission of the client . . . a certified public accountant, 
or a public accountant ••. shall not be required to, and shall not voluntarily, 
disclose or divulge information of which he or she may have become possessed 
relative to and in connection with any examination of, audit of, or report on, 
any books, records, or accounts which he or she may be employed to make. The 
information derived from or as the result of such professional service shall be 
deemed confidential and privileged. This section shall not be construed as 
prohibiting the disclosure to a third party having an interest in or relying on an 
opinion rendered by a certified public accountant. 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 326.166 (Supp. IV, 1967): 
A certified public accountant, or a public accountant, shall not be examined 
••• without the consent of his client as to any communication made by the client, 
to him ••• given or made thereon in the course of professional em:ployment, nor 
shall a secretary, stenographer, clerk, or assistant of a certified public accountant, 
or a public accountant, be examined, without the consent of the client concerned, 
concerning any fact, the knowledge of which he has acquired in his capacity. 
This privilege shall exist in all cases except when material to the defense of an 
action against an accountant. 
NEV. REv. STAT. § 48.065 (1963): 
An accountant cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any 
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the 
course of professional employment . . . • 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-23-26 (1953): 
A certified or registered public accountant shall not be required by any court 
to divulge information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his con-
fidential capacity as such. Provided, however, that the provisions of this section 
shall not apply to auditing under the supervision of the state comptroller. 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 9.lla (Supp. 1967): 
Except by permission of the client ••• a certified public accountant • • • shall 
not be required to, and shall not voluntarily, disclose or divulge information of 
which he may have become possessed relative to, and in connection with any 
professional services as a certified public accountant other than the examination 
of audit of or report on any financial statements, books, records or accounts, which 
he may be engaged to make or requested by a prospective client to discuss • • • 
Provided, however, That nothing herein shall be taken or construed as modifying, 
1266 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66 
relevant information, courts and com.mentators4 generally do not re-
ceive them enthusiastically. This is especially true of statutory privi-
leges unknown to the common law.5 This Note will examine the 
policy bases for the accountant-client privilege and the reception 
which the privilege has received in federal and state courts. In addi-
tion, it will suggest desirable limitations on the scope of the privilege. 6 
The sixteen privilege statutes now in effect vary considerably7 
and may be classified into three groups for purposes of analysis. The 
first category includes the five statutes which convey the broadest 
privilege. Four of these contain only one significant limitation: in-
formation must have been obtained by the accountant in his confi-
dential capacity to qualify for protection under the statute.8 The 
changing, or affecting the criminal or bankruptcy laws of this Commonwealth or 
of the United States. 
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 20, § 790 (1961): 
No court shall require a certified public accountant or a public accountant 
to divulge information or evidence obtained by him in his confidential capacity 
as such. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-114 (1955): 
Certified public accountants practicing in this state shall not divulge, nor 
shall they in any manner be required to divulge, any information which may 
have been communicated to them or obtained by them by reason of the con-
fidential nature of their employment . • • except that nothing in any section of 
this chapter shall be construed as modifying, changing, or affecting the criminal 
and bankruptcy laws of this state or the United States. 
3. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, comment to rule 210 (1942). 
4. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291 (McNaughton ed. 
1961) [hereinafter WIGMORE]. 
5. United States v. Bowman, 358 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1966); 8 WIGMORE § 2286; 49 Nw. 
U.L. R.Ev. 481, 542 (1954). 
6. Most accountant-client privilege statutes have been in effect for some time without 
receiving much attention or provoking much litigation. Arizona and Colorado have 
had a statute since 1960; Florida, 1931; Georgia and Illinois, 1943; Iowa and Michigan, 
1929; Kentucky, 1946; Louisiana, 1908; Missouri, 1967; New Mexico, 1941; Pennsylvania, 
1961; and Tennessee, 1939. Yet Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 670 (1954), reports no cases in 
which a state had found occasion to construe its statute. Within the past two years, 
however, a number of cases which have turned upon construction of these statutes have 
been decided. U.S. v. Bowman, 358 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1966); Weck v. District Court, 408 
P .2d 987 (Colo. 1966); Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court, 423 P .2d 27 (Colo. 1967); Ash 
v. Reiter Co., 429 P.2d 653 (N.M. 1967). In addition, several state legislatures have 
recently considered either adopting accountant-client privilege statutes or altering their 
present statutes. Michigan has amended it statute to include a third-party protection 
clause which prevents accountants and their clients from asserting a privilege against 
members of the public who have been injured by reliance on an accountant's audit. 
Act 306, § 23, MICH. COMP. LAWS (Supp. 1967). In 1967, both houses of the New York 
legislature passed a privilege statute by substantial margins (49 to 7 in the senate on 
March 21, 1967, and 115 to O in the house on March 30, 1967) but the governor vetoed 
the proposal because it did not provide adequate protection to third parties. Memo• 
randum filed with Senate Bill No. 1965-A by Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller (May 2, 1967). 
In the same year Missouri became the sixteenth jurisdiction to grant a statutory 
accountant-client privilege. See note 2 supra for text of statute. 
7. See the chart on the facing page. 
8. The statutes of Illinois, Kentucky, New Mexico, and Puerto Rico. See notes 2 &: 7 
supra. Not only do these statutes contain few of the significant limitations of other 
accountant-client privilege statutes, but the wording of the s~tutes is so poor that 
courts in two states have interpreted the,n to grant a privilege only to the accountant, 






CHARACTERISTICS OF AccOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE STATUTES 
~ 
(express provisions only) 
ARIZ. CoLO. FLA. GA, ILL. IOWA KY. LA. MD. MICH. Mo.• NEV. N.M. PA. P.R. TENN. 
Confidentiality X X X X X X 
requirement 
Crim. & Bankruptcy X X X X X 
exceptions 
Provision for X X X X X X X X X 
I client waiver ~ 
0 ..... 
Professional capacity X X X X X X X X X X X X X I ~ 
requirement 
!Id party protection X X 
clause 
Public accountants X X X X X X X X X X X X 
included 
• The Missouri statute also contains a provision that the privilege shall not operate to prevent disclosure of information material to the defense 
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other statute in the first group is even broader, precluding applica-
tion of the privilege only in the case of testimony about "facts" oc-
curring during the accountant's employment.0 The second, or inter-
mediate, category includes statutes which impose one or more of the 
following specific limitations: (1) that the privilege does not apply 
in criminal or bankruptcy proceedings; (2) that the privilege oper-
ates only with regard to communications made to an accountant in 
the course of his professional employment; (3) that the privilege 
cannot be invoked if the client chooses to waive it.10 The third cate-
gory includes the two statutes which restrict the application of the 
privilege most severely: they contain all of the limitations of the 
intermediate group and a third-party protection clause, which pre-
vents accountants or their clients from asserting the privilege against 
members of the public who have been injured by reliance on an 
accountant's audit.11 
Recent state court decisions indicate that the state judiciary is 
unwilling to construe privilege statutes as broadly as their terms 
would allow. A recent Colorado decision12 held that a corporation 
cannot invoke the_ privilege ag<\inst its stockholders in a shareholders' 
derivative suit. In reaching this decision the Colorado court read into 
the state accountant-client privilege statute an exception analogous 
to a common-law exception to the attorney-client privilege: when 
several persons employ the same attorney their communications to 
the attorney are not privileged inter se. The court ruled that the same 
kind of exception should prevent a corporation from using the ac-
countant-client privilege in the derivative suit context. 
Other recent cases construing state privilege statutes have dealt 
with the question of who can properly invoke the privilege.13 Courts 
in Illinois and New Mexico, faced with "broad"14 statutes, have said 
that these enactments create an "accountants' privilege" which can be 
invoked only by the accountant.15 On the other hand, the supreme 
9. The Georgia statute. See notes 2 &: 7 supra. 
IO. The statutes of Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, 
Nevada, and Tennessee fall into this category. See notes 2 &: 7 supra. 
II. The Michigan and Pennsylvania statutes. See notes 2 &: 7 supra. 
12. Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court, 423 P .2d 27 (Colo. 1967). A shareholder's 
derivative suit for an accounting was brought against the corporation. An employee-
certified public accountant (CPA) of the corporation claimed the accountant-client 
privilege and refused to answer all but initial perfunctory questions. The court here 
rejected the argument that only certified work was privileged, though it denied the 
privilege for the reasons stated in the text. 
13. The term "invoke," as used in this connection, will refer to the party that can 
ultimately control whether or not the privilege will be utilized to protect the confiden-
tiality of a communication. 
14. See text accompanying note 8 supra. 
15. In Dorfman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1963), an accountant's clients 
brought an unsuccessful action to enjoin him from divulging information to the In-
ternal Revenue Service. Although the decision rested on other grounds, the privilege 
was said to be "an accountant privilege, a privilege whose benefit was to inure to, and 
which could only be claimed by, an account.nt." Id. at 907 (emphasis added). In Ash 
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courts of Florida and Colorado, interpreting "intermediate" stat-
utes, 16 have held that the privilege can be invoked only by the 
client.11 Curiously, no state court has indicated that it would read 
any type of statute broadly enough to permit both client and accoun-
tant to invoke the privilege. 
The New Mexico and Illinois decisions point up the greatest 
weakness of the broadly worded statutes. Communications privileges 
are tolerated because they are deemed necessary to promote full and 
honest disclosure between the parties to certain relationships.18 Thus, 
as a matter of policy, such privileges should be invoked only by 
persons having a legitimate interest in keeping the information con-
fidential.10 Thus, only the client may invoke the attorney-client 
privilege,20 and only the patient can control use of the doctor-patient 
privilege.21 By analogy, only the client should be able to assert the 
accountant-client privilege. An accountant may not have an indepen-
dent interest in keeping his client's information secret.22 The broad 
language of the first group of statutes, which has led two courts to 
conclude that the statutory privilege belongs only to the accountant 
may have created an unnecessary bar to the availability of evidence 
relevant to the proper disposition of disputes. These statutes should 
be amended to make clear that the privilege belongs only to the 
client. 
v. Reiter Co., 429 P.2d 653 (N.M. 1967), an aggrieved employee of the accountant's 
client brought an action for wages. The statute was worded in much the same way as 
the Illinois statute (see note 2 supra for the text of each), and the New Mexico court 
expressly followed the dictum in the Illinois case, allowing the accountant to testify 
despite the objections of his client. 
16. See text accompanying note 10 supra. 
17. In Savino v. Luciano, 92 S.2d 817 (Fla. 1957), the court relied on the general 
justification for all privileged and confidential communications to support its rulings 
that the privilege could be waived by the client. It cited the opinion of Judge Learned 
Hand in United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1944), in which Hand 
stated that "[t]he justification for the privilege lies not in the fact of communication, 
but in the interest of the persons concerned that the subject matter should not become 
public," Waiver was allowed in the Florida case even thought the Florida statute does 
not expressly permit the client to waive the privilege. See text of statute at note 2 supra. 
Nine of the existing statutes do contain such a provision. See texts of statutes at note 
2 supra and chart at note 7 supra, 
In Weck v. District Court, 158 Colo. 521, 408 P.2d 987 (1965), the court was not 
directly faced with the question of who had the right to invoke the statute, but stated 
nonetheless that "the privilege created by the Colorado statute is not the privilege of 
the accountant but that of the client." 
18. See Wigmore's four tests for justifying the granting of a communications privi-
lege. 8 WIGMORE § 2285 [cited in Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 
1953) and State v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 168, 169 P.2d 706, 710 (1946)]. For an 
analysis of the accountant-client based on Wigmore's tests, see Note 46 N.C,L. REv. 
419 (1968). 
19. See Judge Hand's statement note 17 supra. 
20. 8 WIGMORE § 2327. 
21. 8 WIGMORE § 2386. 
22. Of course, an accountant does have an attenuated interest in keeping a client's 
disclosures confidential insofar as that will help him to develop a reputation for dis-
cretion among the businessmen he serves. 
1270 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66 
A further question is when, if ever, the policy considerations 
underlying the privilege outweigh the undesirable effects of the con-
comitant loss of relevant information to the fact-finding process. 
There are recent indications that some members of the accounting 
profession feel that the privilege should apply only in situations 
where the accountant performs a "private" advisory or consulting 
function and should not be available to an accountant involved in 
a public audit.23 However, an argument can be made for granting a 
properly limited accountant-client privilege in the public audit situ-
ation. When an accountant performs a public audit, he is often called 
upon to examine data relevant to a variety of complex financial, tax, 
and management problems.24 To analyze such data properly, the ac-
countant should have access to many of the details of his client's 
operations which his client may consider confidential. Admittedly, 
promoting disclosure in order to permit a professional man better to 
serve his client may not always be sufficient justification for a com-
munications privilege.25 Moreover, such a privilege cannot be justi-
fied solely on the ground that it eliminates the ethical problem posed 
when a professional man is called to testify about information which 
he obtained in his professional capacity.26 Nevertheless, when an ac-
23. Letter from Timothy T. McCaffrey, Manager, State Legislation, American In-
stitute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) to Thomas O'Hare, Sept. 7, 1967, on 
file with the Michigan Law Review, indicating that the accounting profession itself is 
divided on the question of the desirability of accountant-client privilege statutes: 
The Institute has not adopted a position either in favor of or in opposition to legis• 
Iation creating a privileged status for confidential communications between CP As 
and their clients. 
The primary interest of most CPAs who desire the creation of a statutory 
accountant-client privilege is to promote full disclosure of information necessary 
for the preparation of income tax returns. This interest in the creation of a privi• 
lege for tax matters, however, is not necessarily compatible with the primary func• 
tion of public accounts-auditing. Reconciling the interests of these two functions 
is not always achieved in privilege legislation. 
Yet, "[s]ome state CPA societies have sponsored privilege legislation and others will 
do so in the future." Letter from Timothy T. McCaffrey supra. 
In the past the AICP A has taken a position against recognition of the privilege. 
See letter from William C. Doherty, Director of Professional Ethics and Legislation, 
AICPA, to the Yale L.J., Nov. 28, 1961, in Comment, Functional Overlap Between the 
Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implication for the Privileged Communication 
Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1248 n.147 (1962). See also Report of the Comm. on State 
Legislation of the AICPA for April 26, 1945; id. for Aug. 27, 1956; Letter to State Society 
Presidents, Jan. II, 1937, from Comm. on State Legislation of the AICPA, excerpts 
printed at 73 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 353 (1942). 
24. Katsoris, Confidential Communications-The Accountant's Dilemma, 35 FORD· 
HAM L. R.Ev. 51 (1966); Memorandum of the N.Y. State Society of CPA's in Support of 
"An act to amend the civil practice law and rules, in relation to making confidential 
communications between public accountant and client privileged communications." 
25. Despite the fiduciary relation recognized between bankers and depositors [State 
ex rel. G. M. Gustafson Co. v. Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N.W.2d 911 
(1946)], and stockholders and customers [Capital Co. v. Fox, 85 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1936)], 
a privilege is denied in both circumstances. 
26. The "point of honor" by which attorneys were granted a personal privilege if 
testifying would cause them professional ethical problems has not been considered a 
sufficient reason for a privilege since the late 18th century. 8 WIGMORE §§ 2286, 2290. 
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countant performs a public audit, it is the public-not the client-
which ultimately benefits from any increased disclosure due to exis-
tence of the privilege.27 Certified financial statements are relied upon 
by prospective creditors and investors.28 Therefore, it is essential that 
a certified public accountant's opinion that a financial statement 
fairly represents the financial position of an audited concern be based 
on careful examination of all relevant materials.29 To the extent that 
an accountant-client privilege can assure audited concerns that fi-
nancial data revealed to accountants will not be disclosed in court, 
it promotes the public interest in having accurate financial state-
ments.30 
However, it must be acknowledged that the promotion of dis-
closure to an accountant by statutory privilege is hindered by the fact 
that so many states have yet to enact a privilege statute. A client with 
an interstate business, or even a client who could be found to be 
"doing business" in a state without a privilege, can never be com-
pletely certain that information provided to an accountant will not 
be disclosed. Therefore, until all jurisdictions enact a privilege, judi-
cial access to information may be effectively limited without realiz-
ing the benefits of increased disclosure to accountants. Although this 
is a factor in considering whether any given privilege statute is achiev-
ing its aims, it does not affect the basic policy question of whether 
the accountant-client privilege even if made effective is justified. 
Assuming that the accountant-client privilege has, at least in cer-
tain cases, the capacity to promote increased disclosure, and that this 
outweighs the adverse effect upon the fact-finding process, it can be 
argued that the privilege still results in a sacrifice of the public's right 
to inquire into the information which the accountant relied upon in 
preparing his audit. If members of the public cannot examine such 
27. The public interest in this matter is evidenced by the fact that every state has 
a law regulating the practice of accountancy. See 1 & 2 CCH AccoUNTANCY L. REP. 
In addition it should be noted that financial statements submitted to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, with few exceptions, must be certified. I L. Loss, SECURI• 
TIES R.EcuLATION 326, 346 (2d ed. 1961). 
28. AICPA, A Description of the Professional Practice of Certified Public Accoun-
tants, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Dec. 1966, at 61. 
When an accountant certifies a financial statement, he examines it and certifies that 
it conforms with generally accepted accounting principles and that it fairly represents 
the financial position of the audited firm. The Code of Ethics for California accountants 
spells out the types of opinions which an accountant may express. 1 CCH ACCOUNTANCY 
L. REP. ~ 4405, at 1361 (1966). 
29. AICPA, supra note 28. 
30. Corporations are today under such regulatory and economic pressure to receive 
an accountant's certification and opinion that they will not refuse the accountant access 
to material information. Many federal regulations require corporations to provide cer-
tified financial statements to investors and shareholders. [E.g., SEC Reg. 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-3 (1968)]. State securities regulation statutes have similar requirements [E.g., 
N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAw § 77 (McKinney 1944)]. In addition, many potential investors 
would require such statements as a matter of course, thus bringing economic pressure 
to bear upon corporations to provide the auditing accountant with all the material 
information which he requires. See Note, 46 N.C.L. REv. 419, 425 (1968). 
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information when they suspect fraud or negligence, they may be less 
willing to rely on certified financial statements. Considered in this 
light the accountant-client privilege may well serve to undermine 
the utility of certified financial statements. There are, however, sev-
eral countervailing factors which operate to mitigate the force of this 
disadvantage. Since a certified public accountant must be indepen-
dent of the concern whose financial statements he certifies, there is a 
considerable amount of institutional protection against fraudulent 
dealing between accountant and client built into the certification 
system.31 More important, most of the existing privilege statutes pre-
vent inquiry only into the information disclosed to an accountant 
during a public audit; they do not prevent inquiry into the proce-
dures used by the accountant in performing his audit.32 In many 
cases, this type of inquiry could sufficiently protect the public in-
terest in careful preparation of financial statements. A more effective 
method of insuring that an accountant cannot use the privilege to 
escape liability for a fraudulent or negligent public audit would be 
to include in the statute an exception to the privilege applicable 
whenever a prima fade case of negligence, fraud, or any crime has 
been established ·in connection with the certification of a financial 
statement.33 Such an exception to the accountant-client privilege 
could be judicially imposed,34 but since the expected benefits could 
be partially negated if the exception were inconsistently applied, it 
31. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Ethics of the AICPA provides that 
"[n]either a member or associate, nor a firm of which he is a partner, shall express an 
opinion on financial statements of any enterprise unless he and his firm are in fact in-
dependent with regard to such enterprise." 2 CCH AccoUNTANCY L. REP. ,r 65,102, at 
15,119 (1965). See also Committee on Professional Ethics of the AICPA, Opinion No. 
12-Independence. 2 CCH AccouNTANCY L. REP. ~ 65,102, at 15,129 (1967). Most states 
have an independency requirement in a code of ethics promulgated by the state agency 
responsible for the regulation of the accounting profession. See Code of Ethics Check 
List, I CCH ACCOUNTANCY L. REP. 181 (1968). 
32. An examination of the wording of the statutes, supra note 2, shows that only 
information transmitted or communicated to the accountant by his client is protected. 
The privileges do not draw a curtain around the entire auditing process. 
33. The attorney-client privilege is barred as to commications of a client who con-
sults -his lawyer concerning a plan or intention to commit a future crime. Regina v. 
Cox, 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884); 8 WIGMORE § 2298; Gardner, The Crime or Fraud Exception 
to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A.J. 708 (1961). This exception may also apply 
to future torts, See Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 861 (1965). The usual rule in the United States 
and England for the application of this exception is that there must be enough evidence 
supporting the charge of illegality to constitute a prima facie case before the court can 
compel disclosure. See Gardner, supra, at 710. There are difficult practical problems in 
the application of this rule, however [Hamil & Co. v. England, 50 Mo. App. 338 (1892)], 
which might impair either the effectiveness of the limitation or the goals of the privi-
lege. On the one hand a prima fade case of a crime or fraud must be presented while 
the information which supports the charge is protected from disclosure; on the other 
hand, if the courts are lenient in demanding sufficient evidence prior to ordering dis-
closure, clients will not be able to rely on the privilege to protect information from 
disclosure, and the goal of the privilege will be thwarted. 
34. See notes 47-51 infra and accompanying text. 
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would seem that this matter should not be left to the uncertainties 
of judicial construction. 
As to an accountant who is acting in a private advisory capacity, 
the best argument for granting a privilege is provided by the similar-
ity between the accountant-client and the attorney-client relation-
ships,311 particularly with regard to advice given in tax matters.36 
However, the characteristics of the attorney-client relationship which 
necessitate a communications privilege are usually not present in the 
accountant-client context. 
The attorney-client privilege is intended to assure persons con-
fronted with complex and unfamiliar legal matters that they need 
not shun professional counsel because of fear that their statements to 
an attorney will be disclosed in court.37 There is more at stake than 
merely a client's need for advice on a perplexing problem; rather, 
the chief consideration is that an individual have fully informed legal 
counsel when his legal rights are at stake.38 Thus, the analogy to the 
attorney-client privilege supports granting an accountant-client privi-
lege only when the accountant is performing services closely related 
to a client's legal rights. For example, the work of accountants and 
35. Since the attorney-client privilege is the oldest and one of the best-supported 
communications privileges, dating from the reign of Elizabeth I, argument by analogy 
to the attorney-client privilege is particularly effective. See 8 WIGMORE § 2290 [cited in 
Radiant Burners Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 929 (1963)). 
36. The similarity of the work performed by accountants and attorneys in the tax 
advisory area has resulted in a long dispute between the two professions concerning 
the proper field of activity for each profession. Aland, Relations Between Lawyers and 
Certified Public Accountants in Federal Tax Practice, 15 A.LA. L. REv. 517 (1963); Ander-
son, The Tax Practice Controversy in Historical Perspective, I WM. & MARY L. REv. 18 
(1957). It now seems to be recognized by the professions Uoint Statement of Principles 
Relating to Practice in Field of Federal Income Taxation, 37 A.B.A.J. 517 (1951)] and 
by the courts [Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954); In re Bercu, 
273 App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, ajfd, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949)] that both 
professions can legitimately perform services in this area, although the line of demar-
cation between the services to be performed by the two professions is not a clear one. 
In Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 183, 52 N.K2d 27, 32 (1943), the court 
stated that "[a] sharp line cannot be drawn between the field of the lawyer and that 
of the accountant. Some matters lie in a penumbra." See also Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 797 
(1950); 56 YALE L.J. 1438 (1947). 
An indication of the similarity of the two professions is that accountants are per-
mitted to represent their clients in hearings before the Department of the Treasury 
[31 C.F.R. § 10.3(a) & (b) (1967)] and before the United States Tax Court [26 C.F.R. § 
701.2(a), (d), & (e) (1961)]. 
37. Hunt v. Blackbum, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
38. Greenhough v. Gaskell, 47 Eng. Rep. 35, 36, 1 My. & K. 98, 99 (1833): 
The foundation of this rule is not difficult to discover. It is not, as has sometimes 
been said, on account of any particular importance which the law attributes to the 
business of legal advisers or any particular disposition to afford them protection . 
• • • But it is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot go on, without 
the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts, and in those 
matters _affecting the rights and obligations, which form the subject in all judicial 
proceedmgs. 
This view was reiterated in Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
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lawyers may overlap to some extent in the tax area, since neither 
group can claim exclusive competence in the tax advisory field.39 On 
some occasions tax accountants perform services which, while they 
do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law,40 are so closely 
related to law that an attorney performing similar services would en-
joy a privilege.41 Within this area of overlap, accountants and their 
clients should not be denied a privilege which would be available to 
attorneys and their client under similar circumstances. Nevertheless, 
the courts have had great difficulty defining the limits of this area of 
overlap.42 Granting the privilege within such an ill-defined area 
would not only pose great practical problems for the courts, but 
would also frustrate the purpose of the privilege, since clients could 
rarely be certain that matters disclosed to an accountant working in 
the tax field would be found to be privileged.43 Thus, although there 
is some justification for conferring an accountant-client privilege in 
those cases in which an accountant performs services similar to those 
of an attorney, it is probably impractical to define a privilege in these 
terms. 
On the same rationale, another setting in which communications 
made to an accountant acting in a private advisory capacity should 
receive some protection is that in which the accountant is aiding an 
attorney in the preparation of a case for trial. Some courts, in the 
absence of a statutory privilege, have extended the attorney-client 
privilege to communications made to an accountant in such a sit-
uation. 44 However, even in a jurisdiction which recognizes this ex-
tension of the attorney-client privilege, the factual circumstances 
triggering its application are not clearly defined.45 This uncertainty 
could destroy a client's assurance that the information revealed to 
an accountant will remain confidential. Thus, the protection of 
communications to an accountant in such a situation can best be 
accomplished by adopting a statute expressly creating such a lim-
ited privilege. 
39. See note 36 supra. As to other kinds of advice on internal business problems 
which an outside accountant may provide through what are called "management ser-
vices," see Note, 46 N.C.L. REv. 419, 426-27 (1968). 
40. See. note 36 supra. 
41. An attorney performing services in this area is privileged unless his work has 
become exclusively that of an accountant. Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th 
Cir. 1954); In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). 
42. See Note 36 supra. 
43. See note 61 infra and text accompanying notes 60-63 infra. 
44. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); United v. Kovel, 206 F.2d 
918 (2d Cir. 1961); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 
231 P.2d 26 (1951). See also Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964) for dicta sup-
porting extension. In the past this extension has been denied. Himmelfarb v. United 
States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949), but it appears that the 
9th Circuit, which decided Himmelfarb, has now changed its position on the matter by 
its decision in United States v. Judson, supra. See generally Katsoris, supra note 19, at 
54. 
45. Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 125 (1964). 
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The statutory accountant-client privileges have generally been 
less restricted in application than the common-law attorney-client 
privilege, 46 even though the former privilege is justified by the sim-
ilarity of an accountant's advisory function to that of a lawyer.47 The 
courts have long applied a number of exceptions to the attorney-
client privilege; these exceptions are not reflected in the language of 
most accountant-client privilege statutes.48 However, since courts 
normally limit novel communications privileges when possible, 49 
they could read similar exceptions into these statutes. Morever, it 
might well be impractical for a legislature to draft a statute enumera-
ting all of the judicial exceptions and variations that have become 
attached to the attorney-client privilege. Yet, the desired result could 
simply be achieved by expressly equating the two privileges in every 
respect.50 This would preserve the ability of the courts to draw upon 
judicial experience gained in dealing with the attorney-client privi-
lege. 
Federal courts have usually held that rule 43(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure requires application of state statutory priv-
ileges such as the accountant-client privilege in nondiversity cases un-
46. Long judicial construction of the attorney-client privilege has developed the 
present limitations of the rule. They include: (1) the crime or fraud exception (note 33 
supra). The lack of a similar protection in the present accountant-client privilege 
statutes suggests the possibility that the privilege might be used by an accountant or 
his client to shield a fraud effected by the accountant certifying to false financial state-
ments. The statute, without this exception, might also be used by the accountant to 
hide his own negligence from the court in a malpractice suit brought against him. But 
see note 32 supra, and accompanying text. (2) The confidentiality requirement. Com-
munications to a lawyer which are not made in confidence are not privileged. 8 \VIG-
MORE § 23ll. Only five of the sixteen accountant-client privilege statutes expressly make 
this a requirement for operation of the privilege. (3) The relevancy requirement. If a 
matter is mentioned to an attorney which is within his professional competence but 
irrelevant to the matter at hand, the privilege is inapplicable. Modern ,voodmen of 
America v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1942). None of the statutes expressly makes 
this requirement for operation of the privilege. 
It is true that the courts have shown a hostility to novel privileges and have, in some 
instances, stated that since the statutes arc in derogation of the common law that a 
strict construction should be applied to them. United States v. Bowman, 358 F.2d 421 
(lid Cir. 1966); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478. 30 A.2d 421 (1943). But see Pattie Lea, 
Inc. v. District Court, 423 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1967). In Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 
(1933), the Supreme Court, justifying an exception to the juror's privilege argued by 
analogy to the crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Thus it is 
possible that the exceptions to the attorney client privilege will be judicially applied to 
statutory privileges. 
Legal counsel for the AICPA advised the Institute that the accountant-client privi-
lege would not apply to communications concerning the prospective commission of a 
crime or perpetration of a fraud. Excerpts from Minutes of State Legislation Comm. of 
the AICPA, Dec. 16, 1966. See also Comment, supra note 23, at 1247-49 (1962) for an 
opinion that the crime or fraud exception will be applied to novel privileges. 
47. See notes 37-41 mpra and accompanying text. 
48. See note 46 supra. 
49. See note 46 mpra. 
50. The equation method has been utilized in some states to create a privilege for 
psychologists. Louisell, The Psychologists in Today's Legal World, 41 MINN. L. R.Ev. 
731, 7ll4 (1957). 
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less there is some federal rule, precedent, or statute to the contrary.151 
Similarly, many federal courts have regarded state statutory privileges 
as binding in diversity actions, 52 although the bases of these decisions 
are varied and unclear. Some of these courts have ruled that the ac-
countant-client privilege is "substantive" and therefore binding on 
federal courts in diversity actions53 under the rule of Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins.54 Other federal courts have either cited rule 43(a)150 
or given no reason for reaching this result.56 However, there are other 
situations in which federal courts do not give effect to the accoun-
tant-client privilege. For example, this privilege cannot be invoked in 
federal criminal proceedings.57 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure58 provides that common-law rules govern the admis-
sibility of evidence in federal criminal cases; since no accountant-
51. FED. R. C1v. P. 43(a): 
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall' be taken orally in open court, un• 
less othenvise provided by these rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is ad-
missible under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence 
heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in 
equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction 
of the state in which the United States Court is held. In any case, the statute or 
rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be 
presented according to the most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes 
or rules to which reference is herein made. The competency of a witness to testify 
shall be determined in like manner. [Emphasis added.] 
Although this seems to bar the operation of state privilege statutes unless such a 
privilege is also recognized by federal law, the federal courts have generally bowed to 
state statutory privileges if there is no federal statute, precedent, or rule to the contrary. 
Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 320, 327 (1964); Katsoris, supra note 24, at 60; 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ,r 43.07, at 97 (2d ed. 1967). Rule 43(a) often does not produce a clear result 
in this area since questions often arise when a state statute precludes admission of cer• 
tain evidence and no federal statute, precedent, or rule allows admission. In this situ• 
ation a division has resulted in the federal courts, Some hold that the old equity prac-
tice of allowing state privilege statutes to be controlling should be continued. Baird v. 
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 1960); Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22, 44 
(N.D. Iowa 1948). Other federal courts have held that rule 43(a) provides for the widest 
rule of admissibility and that state privilege statutes should not be controlling. E.g., 
United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276, 280 n.2 (6th Cir. 1952). The latter result is 
probably more in keeping with the _philosophy of the rule, but it is not necessarily 
demanded by its wording. 
52. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 320, 327-28 (1964); Katsoris, supra note 24, at 59. 
53. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1962); Miller v. 
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 F. Supp. 365 (W.D. Mich. 1953). 
54. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
55. Berdon v. McDuff, 15 F.R.D. 29 (E.D. Mich. 1953); Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sani-
torium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907 (W.D.N.Y. 1947). 
56. Ranger, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 196 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1952); Engl v. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943). 
57. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 n.2 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. 
Culver, 224 F. Supp. 419 (D. Md. 1963); Petition of Borden Co., 75 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. 
Ill. 1948). 
58. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26: 
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, 
unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules. The admissi-
bility of witnesses shall be governed, except when an Act of Congress or these rules 
otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. 
client privilege exists at common law,5 9 the privilege is not available
in this context. In addition, most federal courts have imposed
another significant limitation on the use of the accountant-client priv-
ilege by ruling that it does not apply in federal administrative hear-
ings,6° including hearings held by the Internal Revenue Service.6 '
These courts have ruled that such hearings are not "civil actions";
62
therefore, the usual rule that state statutory rules of evidence control
in nondiversity civil actions 3 is inapplicable.
On balance, the policy considerations do seem to favor granting
a privilege to protect information disclosed to accountants perform-
ing public audits; however, this proposed privilege should be care-
fully limited to permit disclosure when a prima facie case of negli-
gence, fraud, or other criminal conduct which affects the accuracy or
reliability of the audit has been established. There is also a need for
well-defined limits on the availability of the privilege in situations
where accountants act as private advisors, although information dis-
closed to accountants performing legally oriented services should still
be privileged. It is apparent that the existing accountant-client priv-
ilege statutes have been loosely formulated-without attempting accur-
ately to define the limited areas in which the privilege is actually
justified.
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